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ABSTRACT
POLITICAL DYNASTIES AND PROVINCE CREATION:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES
By
Ranel Ram C. Cheng
This study explores the role of “political dynasties” in the creation of new provinces as a 
feature of decentralization reforms in the Philippines. This research looks into whether 
political dynasties are able to create new provinces through gerrymandering in order to 
achieve political ends, thus indicating local elite capture of decentralization reforms. Co-
option of local elite families into representative institutions is a colonial legacy that manifests 
through the persistence of political dynasties in present-day institutions. By using historical 
institutionalism as analytical lens, key historical junctures in center-local relations were 
identified, parallel to the formation of the Philippine state, while situating local elite families 
within each juncture. In this way, this study distinguished between “Executive-led 
gerrymandering” and “Legislative-led gerrymandering” across different time periods. While 
the former fits the prevailing view of gerrymandering as a “strategic choice” of the central 
authority to accommodate rent-seeking by local elites, the latter shows how the Philippine 
Congress as an institution evolved as an amalgamation of local elites from across the country
with the power to create the rules for decentralization, including that of province creation, to 
suit their own political interests in the first place.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Context and motivations for undertaking decentralization reforms is an important 
dimension in analyzing the political economy of decentralization.1 In the Philippines, such 
reforms have been introduced over the past decades supposedly to bridge the gap between the 
national or central government and various local communities. However, there is evidence 
that so-called “political dynasties”, wherein members of a family or clan are elected to 
different positions at the same time or in succession with each other,2 are able to thrive under 
decentralization. These political dynasties constitute local elite families who are able to 
exercise influence in policymaking and the allocation of government resources, not only 
through local government positions in practically every single province in the Philippines but 
also their relatives who make up the national Congress. In this regard, this thesis seeks to 
answer the main research question: Was there local elite capture of decentralization reforms 
in the Philippines?
In the formative years of the Philippine nation, members of elite families represented 
their respective provinces in the early national representative institutions (i.e. Congress) and 
their local counterparts (i.e. municipal councils). Their descendants continue to hold on to 
electoral power to this day. The persistence of political dynasties weakens democratic 
governance as it encourages corruption through personality-based patronage across the 
country3 and gives these dynasties undue electoral advantage which limits opportunities for 
1 Kent Eaton, Kai Kaiser, and Paul Smoke, The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms: Implications 
for Aid Effectiveness, (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2010).
2 Ronald Mendoza, Edsel Beja, Jr., Victor Vendia, and David Yap II, Political dynasties and poverty: Resolving 
the “chicken or the egg” question, 2013. Retrieved from Munich Personal RePEc Archive website 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48380/
3 Sheila S. Coronel, Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban, and Booma B. Cruz, The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and
Well-Born Dominate Congress, (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004).
2reform-oriented, non-dynastic candidates to effectively compete during elections4. This has 
wide implications for institutional reforms such as decentralization in the Philippines that 
seeks empowered governance at the local level.
Decentralization is currently implemented through the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991, which guarantees greater devolution of powers and authority from the central 
government to local government units (LGUs) in the country and a higher share in the 
national revenue collections for these LGUs. Assessment of decentralization reform in the 
country, however, indicates that there is low quality of local services and uneven growth 
across the regions of the country under the current framework.5 Yet, despite the apparent lack 
of capability among LGUs, there has been a “trend of [...] splitting up of a local government 
into two or more smaller jurisdictions” which takes away the ability of these new LGUs to 
maximize economies of scale and special externalities.6 In the Philippines, provinces, as the 
first-level of subnational administrative division, are the largest local government units.7
Today, the Philippines with 81 provinces, has one of the most number of first-level 
administrative divisions in the world. 
This trend of creating new subnational administrative jurisdictions or local 
government units as part of decentralization reform has been observed in other countries as 
well. Although the creation of new units can help in the de-concentration of the bureaucracy 
at the central government level, there has been indication that new local administrative units 
4 Pablo Querubin, “Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines,” Quarterly Journal of Political 
Science, 11 no. 2 (2016): 151-181. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00014182\\
5 Joseph J. Capuno, “The Quality of Local Governance and Development under Decentralization,” in The 
Dynamics of Regional Development: The Philippines in East Asia, eds. Arsenio M. Balisacan H. Hill, 204-244. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007)
6 Joseph J. Capuno, Fiscal transfers and gerrymandering under decentralization in the Philippines (DP 2013-04: 
2013), 14
7 “First-level subnational administrative division” is a standard term for the largest subnational administrative 
division following the central government. Other countries may have different names for their respective first-
level divisions, such as province, state, district, department, or even county. The extent of their functions and 
authority may also vary depending on the country. 
3are done to accommodate political motives. In his study of decentralization in Uganda, an 
“extreme case of unit creation” has been observed as attempts by its President to put 
patronage resources in the newly created districts in order to gain electoral support.8 This 
process of “selection of jurisdiction boundaries, both physical and fiscal… to serve electoral 
objectives by dividing the electorate into units that are easier to target in exchange for votes”
is known as gerrymandering. 9 Green notes that even though there has been extensive 
literature on decentralization as a whole, little focus has been given on the creation of new 
subnational units through gerrymandering under the pretext of decentralization reform.10
Often, these administrative units also constitute the electoral jurisdictions that 
constitute a national legislature such as parliament or congress, thus one explanation as to 
why gerrymandering happens under decentralization is that it is a is a strategic choice of 
national actors in order to gain the support of local elites, who in turn are considered as mere 
rent-seekers who want to maximize their share of national resources.11 Hence, this view also 
emphasizes the greater agency put on central state actors with regard to the creation of 
subnational units as part of the decentralization process, and relegates local elite capture of 
these reforms to mere rent-seeking behavior. However, this would assume a powerful set of 
actors at the central level, particularly national political parties that can implement 
gerrymandering. But in the Philippines, as Hutchcroft noted, a unique characteristic of the 
Philippine polity in comparative politics is how the combination of a weak state bureaucracy 
complemented by weak political party system at the national or central level became an 
8 Elliott Green, District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda (Working Paper No. 24: 2008). Retrieved 
from Crisis States Research Centre Working Papers website 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08b9fed915d3cfd000e28/wp24.2.pdf
9 Stuti Khemani, Gerrymandering Decentralization: Political Selection of Grants-Financed Local Jurisdictions, 
2008. Retrieved from World Bank website 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/Khemani_GerrymanderingDecentralization.pdf
10 Green, District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda
11 Khemani, Gerrymandering Decentralization
4opportunity for local elite families to exert their influence and power as rule makers 
throughout the country.12 This “weak center” allows political dynasties to thrive in their 
respective localities where decentralization reforms are introduced and implemented.  
In light of the persistence of political dynasties across the country and the particular 
trend of creating new subnational jurisdictions through gerrymandering under the guise of 
decentralization reforms, this thesis also seeks to answer: can the creation of new provinces
indicate local elite capture of decentralization reform?
12 Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside: Patronage and Clientelism in Japan, Thailand, and the 
Philippines,” in Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of Democracy, (eds.) Diego Abente Brun and Larry 
Diamond (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 174-203.
52. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. ELITE FAMILIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Bello et al. pointed out that a “weak central authority coexisting with a powerful 
upper-class social organization” emerged following the colonization of the Philippines, in 
contrast to the strong development state among its East Asian neighbors such as South Korea 
and Singapore.13 In studying the history of the Philippines, it is important to note that prior to 
the arrival of the Spanish colonizers in the 16th century, there was no one “country” that ruled 
over the islands. Instead, what existed were various settlements scattered and separated by 
mountains and seas, living in communities called barangays that consisted of up to a hundred 
households bonded by kinship, each having their own village chieftains called datus.14
To exercise authority over the archipelago, Spanish authorities concentrated power in 
the capital Manila while colluding with the pre-existing traditional elite structure by granting 
them special status as intermediary between locals and the Spanish authorities. As practiced 
in Europe at the time, appointments to government posts were usually sold to the highest 
bidder but opportunities for natives or indios were limited and so a slot in the colonial 
administration was based largely on patronage rather than merit.15 By the time the Americans 
displaced the Spaniards and established their own colonial regime over the islands in the 
1900s, a system of patronage had already defined the dynamics between the central authority 
and local elites. 
13 Walden F. Bello, Marissa de Guzman, Mary Lou Malig, and Herbert Docena, The Anti-Development State: 
The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines, (New York: Zed Books, 2005).
14 Danilo R. Reyes, “History and Context of the Development of Public Administration in the Philippines,” in 
Introduction to Public Administration in the Philippines: A Reader (3rd ed.), (eds.) Danilo dela Rosa Reyes, 
Prosperpina D. Tapales, Ma. Olivia Z. Domingo, and Ma. Fe Villamejor-Mendoza (Quezon City: University of 
the Philippines National College of Public Administration and Governance, 2015), 51-74.
15 Ibid., 54-55
6The Americans added to the existing bureaucracy representative institutions in their 
quest to “civilize” Filipino natives on the ideals of democracy. In order to steer away from 
supporting pro-independence movement, the Americans shared some of their political power 
to elites who by then have already established a strong economic base across the country.16
Elections were introduced at both the national and local levels, but those who participated 
and took office were mostly from the traditional elites themselves.17
The Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism identified four clans that served in 
the 12th Congress (2004 to 2007) whose forebears were in the very first Congress that 
declared independence from Spain and another 44 families whose ancestors were elected in 
the first legislative elections under American rule.18 The same study found that 15 percent of 
all members of Congress were third- or fourth-generation politicians.19
The paradox of weak institutions and strong families was borne out of the system of 
patronage that first emerged under Spanish rule and the co-opting of these ruling families by 
the American insular government, which later on reflected post-independence, with the 
proliferation of political dynasties, especially in local government. These families used 
different ways in order to solidify their hold over their respective turfs, be it business or 
politics. Case studies in the book An Anarchy of Families demonstrate the “elite capture” of 
Philippine institutions whereby elite families, through their intimate relationships with 
politicians in government, including some of their own clan members in office, have 
maintained their resilience and exerted their influence over Philippine society.20 Coronel 
further elaborates that, local elites in the form of political dynasties have found various ways 
16 Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside,” 189
17 Sheila S. Coronel, Yvonne T. Chua, Luz Rimban, and Booma B. Cruz, The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy 
and Well-Born Dominate Congress, (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004). 
18 Coronel, et al., The Rulemakers, 2004 
19 Ibid.
20 Alfred W. McCoy, An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2009).
7to consolidate their power, be it through their economic clout, social ties and machinery, the 
use of media and celebrity, intermarriages, force or violence, the perpetuation of myths, or 
through mergers and alliances.21
As part of the democratization movement that emerged after decades of authoritarian 
rule under President Ferdinand Marcos, a new constitution was ratified in 1987, which 
included in principle, the prohibition of political dynasties to guarantee equal opportunity for 
public office, but left it to Congress to enact legislation that would operationalize its 
definition and regulation. More than three decades since, more than 40 proposed legislation 
to regulate these dynasties have been filed in Congress, yet no comprehensive law has been 
successfully enacted that would prohibit political dynasties in all elective posts. In the same 
time period, six Presidents have since taken office. All of them belong to a political dynasty 
who owed their rise to power from their ancestors who began their political careers in local 
governments. That the state is unable to stop or at least mitigate the clout of political 
dynasties in its representative institutions has become a major roadblock for genuine 
democratic representation. 
2.2. LOCAL GOVERNANCE UNDER DECENTRALIZATION
A study by Mendoza and Banaag, pointed out that in the past four election cycles 
from 2007 to 2016, the percentage of provincial governors and vice governors belonging to a 
political dynasty has risen from 70 to 81 percent and 62 to 81 percent, respectively, while up 
to 77.6 percent of members of the House of Representatives (Congress) come from political 
21 Sheila Coronel, “The seven Ms of dynasty building,” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, March 
2007. Retrieved from http://pcij.org/stories/the-seven-ms-of-dynasty-building/
8dynasties. 22 Members of these local elite families have been able to clinch top local 
government positions tasked with drafting and implementing decentralization reforms.
Lange sought to describe how the political power of local elites can lead to different
development outcomes by comparing two neighboring provinces in the Philippines with 
different elite local elite structures.23 His case study showed how, competing local families in 
one province and virtual monopoly of one family in another, was related to the types of 
industries which flourished in these areas and later led to different development outcomes.24
He highlighted, however, that aside from these differences, both provinces under the 
influence of their respective local elites, did not differ in the effectiveness of institutional 
planning of their respective LGUs since elite families were still engaged in promoting their 
own respective electoral, even commercial, agenda.25 Incidentally, a study by Virola et al. 
found a correlation in which provinces having lesser dynastic prevalence (proportion of local 
elected positions occupied by political dynasties) scoring higher points in the recently 
formulated “Good Governance Index” developed by the Philippine Statistics Authority that 
covers outcomes such as education, economic performance, voter participation, crime, among 
others.26 These indicate how the presence of these political dynasties and their influence 
affect the strength of institutional governance in local governments.
22 Ronald U. Mendoza and Miann S. Banaag, Dynasties Thrive under Decentralization in the Philippines
(Ateneo School of Government Working Paper 17-003), 2013. Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2875583. In the Philippines, local elections are held 
simultaneously across the country every three years wherein voters choose a provincial governor and vice 
governor, city/town mayor and vice mayors, provincial council members, city/town council members, and 
Members of the House of Representatives (the Philippine Congress).
23 Andreas Lange, “Elites in Local Development in the Philippines,” Development and Change, 41 no. 1 (2010): 
53-76.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Romulo A. Virola, Kristine Faith S. Agtarap, Priscille C.Villanueva, and Mai Lin C. Villaruel, “The 2016 
Elections and the Good Governance Index: Performance, Promises, or Political Dynasties?” Paper presented at 
the 13th National Convention on Statistics, Mandaluyong City, Philippines, October 2016. Retrieved from 
https://psa.gov.ph/content/2016-elections-and-good-governance-index-performance-promises-or-political-
dynasties
9Provinces, as the first-level of subnational administrative division, are the largest local 
government units in the country. Despite the greater autonomy granted to them however, 
provinces remain largely dependent on the national government for funds. Table 1 shows that 
local governments today remain largely dependent on the national government for funding 
through intergovernmental transfers, also known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) 
mandated by the Local Government Code, even though the same law empowers LGUs to 
collect local taxes and find other revenue sources within their respective jurisdictions. 
Table 1. Average LGU Dependency Ratio (2011-2015) 
LGU Type IRA Local Revenue Sources
Provinces 84.75% 12.36%
Cities 66.18% 31.38%
Municipalities 82.65% 11.68%
Source: Bureau of Local Government Finance
2.3. CREATION OF NEW UNITS UNDER DECENTRALIZATION
The national and local governments are often caught in constant “tugs of war” due to 
the fragmentation of basic services and the failure to properly ensure fiscal independence of 
LGUs in carrying out their devolved functions.27 Yet, the general trend appears to be towards 
further subdivisions. From the 42 provinces that already existed by the end of the Spanish 
colonial rule28, the total number of provinces in the Philippines has almost doubled to 81 at 
present. In contrast, much larger countries in terms of geography and population have fewer 
subnational units (see Table 2) but appear to exercise much stronger local autonomy.
27 Capuno, Fiscal transfers and gerrymandering under decentralization in the Philippines.
28 Maximo Kalaw, The Development of Philippine Politics (1872-1920), (Manila: Oriental Commercial 
Company, 1927). Retrieved from The United States and its Territories Collection, University of Michigan 
Archive: 
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/philamer/afj2233.0001.001/5?page=root;size=100;view=image;q1=the+malolos+c
onstitution
10
Table 2. Government Structures in Selected Countries
Country Population(millions)
Area
(‘000 sq. km) No. of State/Provinces
Government 
Structure
USA 323.99 9,833.52 50 states Federal
Canada 35.36 9,984.67 13 provinces and territories Federal
China 1,373.54 9,596.96 32 provinces, autonomous regions, and special units Unitary
India 1,266.88 3,287.26 36 states and territories Federal
Indonesia 258.32 1,904.57 33 provinces and autonomous regions Unitary
Philippines 102.62 300.00 81 provinces Unitary
Source: CIA World Factbook, estimates as of 2016
Green attempted to understand why, in Uganda, the subdivision of the country into 
many districts was a major component of its decentralization reform.29 His analysis first 
pointed out that decentralization reform occurred simultaneous to other government reforms 
introduced after the coup led by Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. He concluded that
Museveni used the gerrymandering of new districts in the country under the guise of 
decentralization, so as to create new sources of patronage by pouring central government 
resources to district allies and to remain in power for over three decades.
Similarly, it was also intergovernmental funds from the central government that was
found by Capuno to be a significant motivation for municipal (town) mayors in the 
Philippines to lobby for the conversion of the status of their municipalities into new, full-
fledged cities (metropolitan governments) which is entitled to bigger allocations of these 
fund.30 At present, creation of new LGUs or change in status is determined by the central 
government through legislation passed by Congress. Interestingly, it was mayors facing term 
limits who were more likely to push for conversion of their towns into cities and when
successful, the succeeding mayor of the newly converted LGU would most likely be a 
29 Green, District Creation and Decentralisation in Uganda.
30 Capuno., Fiscal transfers and gerrymandering under decentralization in the Philippines.
11
relative.31 This study, however, focuses more on towns and cities. Provincial governments, as 
LGUs themselves, not only receive their own share of central government grants, they also 
exercises authority over smaller LGUs such as towns and cities under their jurisdiction. 
Both these examples demonstrate what Khemani calls “gerrymandered 
decentralization” which considers these “reforms” being made as a political choice in which 
new local government units are formed for the purpose of pouring in grants from the central 
government targeted to gain support from these localities.32 By subscribing to the theory of 
decentralization as a strategic choice, the underlying assumption would be that the “reform” 
or in this case, the creation of new subnational units fits the political interest of national
actors, be it the President as in Uganda or Congress as in the Philippines, with local actors 
simply lobbying for or out to get a share of available grants, rather than attributing it to the 
local elite capture of decentralization reforms. 
However, to frame decentralization simply in terms of these political choices can 
prove inadequate, as found by Sudhipongpracha and Wongpredee who analyzed why it took 
so long and slow for Thailand to adapt decentralization reforms.33 They argued that the slow 
progress of decentralization in Thailand was not due to a “lack” of a democratic tradition in 
their culture, nor the constant compromises between national and local politicians; but rather, 
can be traced to the historical development of Thailand as a modern state.
Sudhipongpracha and Wongpredee identified “critical historical junctures” that 
defined the dynamics between central and local elite.34 From a feudal nation with multiple 
centers of power, the modern Kingdom of Thailand began to exert direct rule over formerly 
31 Ibid.
32 Khemani, Gerrymandering Decentralization
33 Sudhipongpracha, Tatchalerm and Wongpredee, Achakorn, “Demystifying Decentralization and Its Setbacks: 
Evidence from Thailand’s Decentralization Reform,” International Journal of Public Administration, 39 no.6 
(2016): 437-448.
34 Ibid.
12
semi-autonomous regions and vassal states, fearing annexation by European imperialists who 
were actively engaged in neighboring kingdoms in Southeast Asia in the early 20th century. 
Electoral fraud and cases of corruption in the late 1980s spurred a democracy movement that 
rewrote the constitution to enshrine local autonomy in government affairs but the new 
government put a highly ineffective Ministry of Interior to be in charge of implementing
decentralization reform, which allowed collusion between central bureaucrats and local elites. 
Decentralization in Thailand has likewise featured an increase in the number of local 
government units, doubling in just a period of 10 years. The inability of local governments to 
deliver on services became the rationale for Prime Minister Thakshin Shinnawarta to 
implement his highly centralized “CEO-style” policies that relegated the role of provincial 
governors as Prime Minister Assistants instead of local chief executives in their own right. 
The case of Thailand demonstrates how the set-up of decentralization reforms allows
or constrains the influence of national and local elites. Similarly, the Philippines has also 
undergone periods of centralization and decentralization in governance, but unlike Thailand, 
Philippine institutions were borne out of a colonial legacy. The period of colonization is 
described as the centralization of authority and resources towards the colonial administration 
based in Manila and later during the authoritarian regime under former President Ferdinand 
Marcos.35 Decentralization in its current form emerged after the 1986 EDSA People Power 
uprising36, which served as a counteraction against the legacy of one-man dictatorial rule.37 In 
other words, decentralization in the current context is considered an integral part of 
democratization in the Philippines. 
35 Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., “Decentralization, Devolution and Democratization: Old Concepts, Contemporary 
Applications,” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 12, no. 1 (1996): 83-88.
36 The Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Metro Manila, more popularly known by its acronym EDSA, was the 
site of protests and mass demonstrations on February 1986 that led to the fall of the Marcos dictatorship.
37 Hal Hill, Arsenio M. Balisacan, and Sharon Faye A. Piza, “The Philippines and Regional Development,” in 
The Dynamics of Regional Development: The Philippines in East Asia, (eds.) Arsenio M. Balisacan H. Hill 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007), 2.
13
Yet, political dynasties continue to dominate in both national and local governments. 
Although the 1987 Constitution that emerged from the democratization movement in the 
Philippines after two decades of authoritarian rule, sought to restore democratic governance 
in the country, the continuing prevalence of political dynasties is a bane to the maturing of 
the Philippines as a truly democratic state. Indeed, “democratic decentralization” does not 
guarantee deeper democratization at grassroots levels.38
Their persistence throughout the history of the Philippines is an important point to 
consider in studying the political economy of decentralization. With the devolution of 
services and financial resources, these ruling families have access not only to public funds 
but also to special powers granted by law to Congress and local governments. Among these 
powers are provisions that allow the creation of subnational local government units, through 
special legislation crafted by Congress. 
2.4. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
This thesis seeks to answer the main research question: Was there local elite capture 
of decentralization reform in the Philippines? In particular, this research looks into the
politics behind the creation of new local government units that occur under decentralization, 
which has been given little focus on the overall literature about these reforms. 
In the Philippines, new provinces are created through laws drafted by Congress, 
which are mostly comprised of political dynasties themselves. In most cases, congressmen, 
who are elected from legislative districts drawn based on the provinces, are often related to 
local officials from their home province. By contextualizing this issue in the Philippine 
38 Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Centralization and Decentralization in Administration and Politics: Assessing Territorial 
Dimensions of Authority and Power,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 14 
no. 1 (2001), 23-53.
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setting, this thesis argues that the creation of subnational jurisdictions can be a symptom of 
local elite capture of decentralization reforms. In order to describe the nature of possible local 
elite capture, this thesis shall seek to specifically answer: can the creation of new provinces
indicate local elite capture of decentralization reform?
This research shall focus on the interaction between historical process of center-
region relations and the formation of local elites in the country. In this regard, this thesis aims 
achieve the following research objectives. First, to identify the role of political dynasties as 
actors in the decentralization process—how they emerged and how they maneuver through 
institutions. Another important objective is to describe how provinces were created 
throughout the history of the Philippines.
Using the case of the Philippines as an example, this research can contribute to a 
deeper understanding on the process of local elite capture in decentralization reforms. 
Previous studies have already begun scratching the surface on the effects of elite families 
such as political dynasties on economic development and democratic participation, but there 
is a need to connect dynastic politics with overall decentralization reform. This thesis seeks to 
contribute to the research on the interplay between elite families and the state by focusing on 
how political dynasties can influence and also possibly benefit from the creation of new 
subnational jurisdictions.
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3. STUDY FRAMEWORK
3.1.INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DECENTRALIZATION
Much of the literature on decentralization focus on the assessment of decentralization 
reforms in terms of outcomes that encourage efficiency and accountability in governance. 
These classical economic theories have been useful in identifying issues such as asymmetries 
between local and national government under the fiscal decentralization framework, as well 
as the social welfare policies in local areas. Although the beauty of such framework is its 
empirical testability, this paradigm does not entirely capture context in which decentralization 
reforms were initiated in the first place. 
Decentralization, like many governance reforms, does not exist in a vacuum.
Historical institutionalism as an analytical lens in comparative politics takes into account the 
various interactions within and among institutions.39 Newer theories on decentralization have 
now emphasized how such policies are designed, in terms of representation, fiscal 
arrangements among different levels of government, and the political party system, while 
considering such institutional arrangements as endogenous.40
Decentralization in itself, however, is not simply one uniform process of shifting 
power and resources away from a central authority towards specific localities. Brillantes 
describes specific modes or forms of decentralization in the Philippines: (1) “deconcentration” 
which is the administrative transfer of functions from a central office to field counterparts in 
local areas; (2) “devolution” which is the transfer of political powers and authorities from the 
39 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” in Structuring 
Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, eds. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen,and Frank 
Longstreth (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1992.
40 Jonathan A. Rodden, “Federalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, eds. Barry R. Weingast 
and Donald A. Wittman, (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2006), 364-366. 
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national government to local governments such as provinces or cities; and (3) 
“debureaucratization” which is the transfer of functions and authorities towards the private 
sector or civil society.41 Atienza adds another form of decentralization called “delegation” of 
powers and functions to semi-autonomous organizations such as public corporations and 
development authorities, which are not necessarily under direct control of central government 
agencies. 42 Hutchcroft provides a simpler view of decentralization that summarizes the 
different modes described above as a “complex interplay” occurring within and between two 
distinct spheres: the administrative that largely deals with the bureaucracy and the political
which covers the power play among institutions.43
However, how policies and reforms were carried out is only one dimension in 
analyzing the political economy of decentralization. Studying why countries pursue 
decentralization recognizes that different countries had different motivations in pursuing 
decentralization. Depending on whom you ask, decentralization can be framed as a means for 
efficient delivery of services, a way to effectively govern vast territories, or a method for 
checks and balance that exact accountability from leaders.44 They can come as a result of a 
shift in the economic structure, or as a way to ease ethnic tensions, or as a way of deepening 
democratization, among others.45
Finally, the study of key actors who pursue and implement of reforms is likewise 
important in understanding the process of decentralization. No one individual or group—be 
they elected officials or career bureaucrat—can implement, support, even block, 
41 Brillantes, “Decentralization, Devolution and Democratization.”
42 Maria Ela L. Atienza, “Local Governments and Devolution in the Philippines,” in Philippine Politics and 
Governance: An Introduction, eds. T.S. Encarnacion Tadem and N.M. Morada (Quezon City: University of the 
Philippines, 2006).
43 Hutchcroft, “Centralization and Decentralization in Administration and Politics.”
44 Rodden, “Federalism,” 357-370.
45 Jennie Litvack, Junaid Ahmad, and Richard Bird, Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries. 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1998).
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decentralization reforms on their own.46 The UNDP further notes that decentralization is not 
confined to government, but rather, it goes beyond other sectors such as private individuals 
and civil society organizations.47 In relation to actors, the incentives to implement such 
reforms are also important with reference to the context under which they take place. 48
3.2. WHY STUDY ACTORS?
Actors are inherently both rule makers and rule takers; while institutions are borne 
from the decisions and compromises made by actors and groups, the institutions themselves 
serve to construct the identities and positions of these actors. 49 Although historical 
institutionalism puts the analytical locus on the institutions, one can also argue for the need to 
focus even more on particular actors or set of actors that maneuver through these institutions 
since they can be both objects and agents of the historical process. Though there have been 
studies on decentralization in the Philippines that focused on specific groups such as NGOs 
and civil society organization, indigenous peoples, and cultural minorities, they are often 
framed in terms of how they responded to the reforms introduced. 
On the other hand, existing literature on the introduction of these reforms focused 
more on formal government actors. For example, Eaton zeroed in on the role of the national 
legislatures in introducing economic reforms, including fiscal policies under decentralization
following democratization movements in Argentina and the Philippines. The extensiveness of 
these policies was molded relative to the preferences of multiple individual members and the 
legislature as a whole, which in turn has serious implications in terms of how a country can 
46 Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke, The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms
47 UNDP, Decentralization: A Sampling of Definitions, [PDF], 1991. Retrieved from 
http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/decentralization_working_report.PDF.
48 Eaton, Kaiser, and Smoke, The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms.
49 Gregory Jackson, “Actors and Institutions,” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis, eds. 
Glenn Morgan, John Campbell, Colin Crouch, Ove Pederson, Peer H. Christensen, and Richard Whitley 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 65.
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absorb external shocks.50 In connection, this thesis will touch on the political dynasties that   
make up a significant proportion of the national legislature.
With regard to theories on institutional actors, there has been a trend to move towards 
“actor-centered institutionalism under the so-called “new institutionalism” paradigm, which 
for all intents and purposes, is a relatively new understanding of institutions that somehow 
combines rational thought and historical institutionalism wherein the intentional actions and 
the structured interactions of actors are seen as shaping specific policy outcomes. 51 Unlike in 
strategic choice theory, both formal and informal institutions can influence actor’s 
preferences since actors are not considered rational. Additionally, unlike in “traditional”
historical institutionalist perspective, an actor’s agency in a particular process is emphasized 
over the role of the critical junctures of history since actions are not determined by the 
constraints or prescriptions of institutions. 
This rather new “new institutionalism” was used by Alexandra Boessen in the 
analysis of health policy-making in the Europe by identifying the strategic behavior of 
various actors such as the European Union in order to exert influence towards harmonizing
the healthcare system policies of individual countries even though they are technically 
exempt from EU laws.52 Their interests were already set as a given, thus analysis was made 
on their strategic behaviors in relation to interactions with other actors and institutions.
However, by considering actor’s attributes as a given, actor-centered institutionalism
fails to consider the dynamic process of identity-formation and how actors can actually 
50 Kent Eaton, Politicans and Economic Reform in New Democracies: Argentina and the Philippines in the 
1990s. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002).
51 Eva-Maria Maggi, The Will of Change: European Neighborhood Policy, Domestic Actors and Institutional 
Change in Morocco (Berlin: Springer VS, 2015).
52 Alexandra Cornelia Martina Boessen, The politics of European Union health policy-making: An actor-center 
instutionalist analysis (Doctoral dissertation). 2008. Retrieved from Maastricht University 
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/portal/files/643299/guid-33ea2961-baf9-46cd-ac21-450151abd759-
ASSET1.0
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change or evolve their interests at different points in time. While there is, indeed, the need to 
focus more on actors in the analysis of institutional processes, the influence of critical 
historical junctures in the formation of institutions and these changes in interests among
actors cannot be downplayed. 
It is important to remember that as actors maneuver through institutions, institutions 
will still be the reference point in which these actors will be defined or how they make their 
own definitions institutions.53 Methodologically, this means that studying an entire process 
such as decentralization can be made by comparing variations in patterns of institutional 
change, either across place (e.g. cross-country comparison) or across time (e.g. historical 
comparison), while situating the intentional action of actors within these institutional 
variations as a legitimate subject of research.54
3.3. METHODOLOGY, SCOPE, AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis seeks to determine whether there was local elite capture of decentralization 
reform in the Philippines by focusing on the role of local elites, in the form of political 
dynasties, as institutional actors. Similar to the study of Sudhipongpracha and Wongpredee in 
Thailand, this research shall use historical institutionalism as analytical lens by using the 
institutional process of decentralization as reference point in identifying the “critical 
historical junctures” in the relationship between the central government and local 
governments in the Philippines. This means looking at the evolution of center-local relations
across time, parallel to the formation of the modern state. Laws on local government 
administration, especially how local government units are created or defined, shall also be 
explained in depth.  
53 Jackson, “Actors and Institutions,” 79-80
54 Ibid., 70
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However, as literature by Bello et al. and Hutchcroft point out, institutions in the 
Philippines are themselves a product of colonial legacy borne out of a system of patronage 
and collusion with elite families. As such, this research shall also trace how these elite 
families evolved into becoming the “political dynasties” that we know of today. By situating 
the process of how local elites and their interests were formed along the critical historical 
junctures of center-local relations, we can better understand the role of political dynasties as 
actors, vis-à-vis the evolution of local administration, the introduction of decentralization 
reforms, and their interaction with other actors in the development of the Philippine state.
Finally, in order to “locate” local elite capture of decentralization reforms in the 
Philippines, the creation of provinces through gerrymandering shall serve as the variable of 
interest. Similar studies as the one by Green in Uganda assumed that gerrymandering was a 
strategic choice by national actors. This time, the locus shall be on local elites in the form of 
political dynasties to demonstrate how the creation of new subnational jurisdictions can, in 
fact, indicate local elite capture of decentralization reforms.
This study uses historical case study approach as the main method for data gathering 
by using primary sources such as archival documents, legal documents (constitutions, laws, 
executive issuances, court decisions), government reports, constitutional records; and 
secondary sources such as investigative reports, news articles, and a review of existing 
literature, in order to establish the “historical base” or context of the relationship between 
decentralization and institutional actors.55 Existing databases on political dynasties from the 
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, the AIM Policy Center, and media 
organizations, as well as election results from the Commission on Elections, also provide 
valuable insight on the family ties among elected officials.
55 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (6th ed.), (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
SAGE Publications, Inc., 2016), 165.
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Whereas the strength of this approach is the depth of the analysis of the case of the 
Philippines,56 certain contexts unique to its institutional set-up may not applicable to other 
countries. Instead, historical analysis offers a method to examine and reexamine other 
possible angles of a particular problem, 57 which in this case is local elite capture in 
decentralization reforms.
56 Ibid., 19
57 Ibid., 165
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4. CRITICAL JUNCTURES IN CENTER-LOCAL RELATIONS
This section discusses the parallel evolution of center-local relations vis-à-vis the 
maneuvering of elite families within institutions, leading up to the present implementation of 
decentralization reforms. Particular attention was given to how new provinces were defined 
and created throughout history. Building upon the work of previous researches, this thesis 
identified the following critical historical junctures: (1) the establishment of a central 
authority under Spanish colonization, (2) the establishment of the first democratic 
representative institutions with provincial elite collusion under American colonization, (3) the 
approval of the first decentralization laws after full independence from foreign rule, (4) the 
regionalization program under the Marcos dictatorship, and (5) decentralization as a key 
feature of the democratization movement following the EDSA People Power uprising.
4.1. ESTABLISHING A CENTRAL AUTHORITY OVER THE ISLANDS UNDER 
SPANISH RULE (16th-19th centuries)
Because there had never been any central government authority controlling the entire 
archipelago that would eventually become the Philippines, the Spanish conquistadors took 
advantage of various internal feuds among ethnic groups and pitted them against each other.58
The Spanish Crown granted encomiendas for Spanish expedition leaders as authority to 
collect tribute from locals as compensation for their contribution to the expansion of the 
empire.59 A number of the established barangays (villages) were combined to form the first 
pueblos or towns for effective control of the conquered natives. The Spanish authorities 
58 Albert F. Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: the Political Economy of 
Authoritarianism, (West Port, CT: Prager, 1997), 10
59 Reyes, “History and Context of the Development of Public Administration in the Philippines,” 54-55
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effectively retained the nobility of the ancient datus (village chieftains) and appointed them 
as cabeza de barangay (head of the barangay). From among the cabezas, one 
gobernadorcillo was chosen to lead the pueblo. The descendants of the ancient datus who 
became cabezas and gobernadorcillos, made up a new principalia class, a special status 
granted to a select group of native families who served as intermediary between locals and 
the Spanish authorities, and later making up the middle class of colonial society.60
The Spanish authority effectively consolidated the scattered indigenous structures to 
form the first local governments that would answer to a centralized bureaucracy led by the 
Governor General seated in the capital Manila.61 Immediately under him were the alcaldes-
mayor or governors who exercised authority over the provinces (alcaldia), which in turn were 
a cluster of pueblos organized through royal decree.62 The Spanish Governor General and the 
alcaldes-mayor, however, relied on the local cabezas and gobernadorcillos to collect the 
tributes and taxes from the communities in order to effectively run the colonial government.63
Appointment of natives or indios in the colonial administration, pooled from the principalia
class, was based largely on patronage rather than merit.64 Ironically, some of the wealthier 
members of the principalia who received education in Europe became the elite scholars who
led the reformation movement calling for representation of natives in colonial affairs,65 which 
later served as inspiration for the Philippine revolution against Spain, funded largely by a 
section of the principalias. 
60 Emmanuel S. de Dios, “Local Politics and Local Economy,” in The Dynamics of Regional Development: The 
Philippines in East Asia, (eds.) Arsenio M. Balisacan and Hal Hill (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 2007), 157-203.
61 Mario D. Zamora. “Political History, Autonomy, and Change: The Case of the Barrio Charter.” Asian Studies: 
Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia, 5 no. 1 (1967): 79-100.
62 Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, 11
63 de Dios, “Local Politics and Local Economy,” 162
64 Reyes, “History and Context of the Development of Public Administration in the Philippines,” 54-55
65 Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, 13
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In 1898, the Philippines declared independence from Spain with General Emilio 
Aguinaldo as President of the Revolutionary Government (now known as the First Republic 
of the Philippines). However, infighting among the revolutionary forces and factions of the 
principalia made this new government weak and failed to fend off the advances of the 
Americans, who began their own venture into empire with the acquisition of former Spanish 
colonies, including the Philippines, after their victory in the Spanish-American War in the 
same year. The short-lived First Republic of the Philippines66 ceased when American forces 
captured Aguinaldo and a new colonial government was established.
One of the earliest studies on Philippine politics by Kalaw in 1927 identified 42 
provinces that were created by the end of the Spanish rule, which would have corresponded 
to the provinces to be represented in the National Assembly under the First Republic.67 An 
interesting note is that the provinces represented did not include the Muslim-dominated 
regions in Mindanao, which the Spanish colonial regime had failed to completely pacify but 
were nonetheless included in colonial maps at that time. Although the exact membership or 
the manner of selection of this National Assembly has not been recorded properly, existing 
documents indicate that the representatives either elected or appointed were mostly made up 
of the principalia class. At least four modern political dynasties, the Apacibles and Laurels of 
Batangas, the Aquinos of Tarlac, and the Ocampos of Manila, had forebears who were first 
elected during the First Republic.68
66 Philippine Independence from Spain was declared on June 12, 1898. The Constitution of this newly 
independent Republic of the Philippines was ratified January 21, 1899, though it did not gain international 
recognition at the time due to the Treaty of Paris where the United States acquired the former Spanish colonies, 
including the Philippines. In February 1899, a month after the ratification of the Constitution, the Philippine-
American War broke out and so this Constitution was not effectively enforced.  
67 Kalaw, The Development of Philippine Politics (1872-1920)
68 Coronel, et al., The Rulemakers, 72
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4.2. THE CREATION OF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS UNDER 
AMERICAN RULE AND COLLUSION WITH PROVINCIAL ELITES (1901-1946)
Having inherited what remained of the colonial government structure left by Spain, 
the Americans had the two-fold challenge of building upon a “residual architecture” of 
government while at the same time eliciting support from pro-independence groups in the 
Philippines.69 The American response was a mix of centralizing administrative authority 
while decentralizing political powers. The US government established the Philippine 
Commission led by Governor General William Howard Taft to exercise both executive and 
legislative powers in the country.70 All laws and regulations, including budget appropriations 
and the creation of agencies, emanated from the Commission. The Americans sought to
distinguish themselves from other colonial powers in their explicit support for local 
autonomy, inspired in part by the US federal system. Acts No. 82 and 83 passed by the 
Philippine Commission organized municipal governments and provincial governments 
throughout the archipelago. In his instruction to the Commission, US President William 
McKinley emphasized “native control” of local affairs:
In the distribution of powers among the governments organized by the commission, 
the presumption is always to be in favor of the smaller subdivision, so that all the 
powers which can be properly be exercised by the municipal government shall be 
vested in that government… following the distribution of powers between the States 
and the National Government of the United States.71
However, the American colonial government’s support for local autonomy stemmed 
not only from its goal of providing “political tutelage” to Filipinos; there was also a 
pragmatic recognition that in order to steer the moneyed principalia away from supporting 
69 Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside,” 188
70 Paul D. Hutchcroft, “Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local 
Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 59 no. 2 (May 2000), 277-
306.
71 U.S. Division of Insular Affairs, “Public Laws and Regulations Passed by the United States Philippine 
Commission,” 1901, Hathi Trust Digital Library. Retrieved from 
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100221210
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pro-independence movement, the Americans also had to distribute political power to elites 
who by then have already established a strong economic base across the country.72 Municipal 
and provincial councils were composed of Filipinos, elected by Filipinos, but in practice, only 
those wealthy enough to pay taxes were qualified to vote or take office, while American 
military supervision was still deployed to local governments 73 and the Philippine 
Commission retained the power to remove local officials. 
Another peculiarity of the Philippine colonial experience under the Americans was 
that the latter emphasized the formation of Philippine representative institutions before 
strengthening the professional bureaucracy.74 In other words, unlike other colonizers, the 
Americans intentionally reined in local elites with them to take part in the exercise of political 
authority, rather than building the administrative institutions to exercise authority over
them.75 The American authorities recognized the influence of these local elites whom they 
called caciques “who combined local office with landed wealth to gain extraordinary control 
over the countryside.”76 Ironically, by focusing on building representative institutions at the 
expense of professionalizing a central bureaucracy worked, the Americans were able to co-
opt the cacique class to successfully secure their interest in the process of Filipinization of
institutions while encouraging, to an extent, rent-seeking behavior practiced by local elites in 
municipal and local governments, whereby the colonial administration still did not have 
qualms in asserting central government control when needed.77 Thus, it appears that the 
American colonial regime simply took advantage of this need for Filipinos to be 
represented in administration, and introduced decentralization as an avenue for 
72 Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside,” 189
73 Brillantes, “Decentralization in the Philippines: An Overview,” 134
74 Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside,” 189
75 Ibid.
76 McCoy, An Anarchy of Families, 12
77 Atienza, “Local Governments and Devolution in the Philippines,” 421
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political representation through the newly established democratic institutions, but 
retained administrative control over national and local affairs.
In 1907, the US Congress established a bicameral Philippine legislature: the 
Philippine Commission became the upper house and an all-Filipino National Assembly 
became the lower house. This provided additional opportunities to local elites to run for 
office not only on the municipal and provincial level, but also at the national level.78 In 1917, 
the Philippine Commission was replaced by the Philippine Senate as the new upper house of 
the legislature and the National Assembly was renamed as the House of Representatives. For 
the first time, Filipinos controlled two chambers of its legislative branch. 
With the Executive branch headed by an American Governor-General, the Philippine 
legislative became the new locus of power for Filipino native elites. 79 The relationship 
between the colonial government and elites can perhaps be described by one of the first major 
landmark legislation passed by the all-Filipino legislature: the Administrative Code of the 
Philippine Islands80 which included, among others, a harmonization of laws and regulations 
covering local governments. The Code, named the different provinces along with their 
respective component municipalities, and the City of Manila as the “grand divisions” of the 
Philippines, together with the definition of their borders.81 The “grand divisions” made by the 
Americans were patterned after the existing provinces during the Spanish era, albeit with 
some modifications including the division of some provinces like Camarines and Misamis, as 
well as the merging of others to create new ones such as Palawan and Mountain Province. 
Some provinces were renamed such as Rizal while new provinces were carved out such as 
78 Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside,” 189
79 Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, 15
80 The first Administrative Code was passed as Act No. 2657 on December 31, 1916. However, it was later 
revised four months after by Act No. 2711 passed on March 10, 1917. Unless stated otherwise, any mention of 
the American-era Administrative Code shall refer to the revised Act No. 2711.
81 Act No. 2711, Sections 42 to 63
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Tayabas and Romblon. The Administrative Code also officially organized and incorporated
seven Muslim-majority provinces to be supervised by the “Department of Mindanao and Sulu” 
even though residents continued to resist control by colonial authorities as they did under the 
Spaniards. In specific cases, “sub-provinces” were also organized, supervised by a lieutenant 
governor who answered to a provincial governor. These sub-provinces were usually smaller 
islands or isolated mountainous areas that were far from the provincial capital. Some of these 
sub-provinces would later become full-fledged provinces.   
Interestingly, there were different rules governing the selection of local government 
officials. The Administrative Code made a distinction between provinces covered by 
“election laws” and those that were not. Provinces that the American colonial authority 
deemed fit to exercise local autonomy were allowed the direct election of provincial and 
municipal officials, while those that were needed to be under direct control by the colonial 
authority had local officials appointed by the American Governor-General. Yet, even with 
such distinction made, the American Governor-General still exercised expansive powers over 
all local governments, including powers to determine which provinces to be covered by 
election laws, to remove any local official and fill any vacancies, to fix boundaries, to create 
new subdivisions, and to make any necessary redistricting of territory.82 In this regard, the 
creation of new provinces was still essentially, in accordance to whether the Americans can 
“allow” them to exercise local autonomy. Furthermore, even though Filipino elites were now 
able to participate and engage in elective office both at the local and national levels, at the 
end of the day, they were still subject to the central authority of the Governor-General.
82 Act No. 2711, Sections 80 to 87
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Another distinct characteristic of the American colonial regime was how it oversaw 
the creation of political parties as part of its mission to provide political tutelage.83 Governor-
General Taft, for example, lent his support for the Federalistas, a Filipino party that 
campaigned for the annexation of the Philippines as a US state, by giving party members a 
key role in the appointment of local officials.84 Taft, who hailed from the state of Ohio, which 
itself was known for patronage-based party system, saw no wrong in the same style of 
political party formation in the Philippines.85 In this regard, the formation of political parties 
in the Philippines was also weaved intricately into the system of patronage politics.
One party in particular, the Nacionalistas, would later dominate Philippine politics in 
the decades that followed by combining “provincial base with access to national power” as 
perfected by their party leaders, Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña—provincial governors 
who became the first Senate President and the first Speaker of the National Assembly, 
respectively.86 The two would also becoming leading figures in the negotiations with the US 
federal government that laid the groundwork for later independence. They would eventually 
succeed and become respectively, the first and second Presidents of the Commonwealth of 
the Philippines. It was also during this early foray into representative democracy when at 
least 44 modern political dynasties entered into politics, including clans that would later on 
produce Quezon and Osmeña’s successors.87
Following successful lobbying by Filipino politicians, the US Congress passed the 
Philippine Independence Act (also known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act), which established 
83 Hutchcroft, “Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords,” 287-288
84 Ibid.
85 Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside,” 190
86 Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside,” 189-190
87 Coronel, et al., The Rulemakers, 72
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the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935. A ten-year transition period was prescribed 
before “complete independence” was granted to the Philippines.88
The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines instituted a republican form of government 
with three co-equal branches patterned to that of the United States. However, this 
Constitution emphasized a strong central authority embodied by a strong Executive branch 
since advocates for empowering local governments lost during the drafting convention.89 In 
fact, there was no separate provision detailing the extent of the relationship between the 
central government and local governments, except that the President had “general supervision 
of local governments, as provided by law.”90 In effect, this passed on to the President of the 
Commonwealth of the Philippines as head of government the same powers exercised by the 
American Governor General to define borders, create new administrative jurisdictions, and 
appoint local officials as needed. This gave the elected President of the Commonwealth 
Manuel Quezon, centralized control of “patronage resources” rather than incentives to 
strengthen central government institutions to carry out effective administration.91 Notably, 
during this period, Quezon did not wield his power to create new provinces. 
With regard to decentralization in the Philippines, the legacy of the 1935 Constitution
was the enshrinement of provincial representation in the legislative branch through the 
creation of single-member districts in the Congress and guaranteeing a representative for 
every province.92 Single-member district representation meant that members of the cacique
can now focus on elections within their districts, thereby strengthening their electoral 
88 Philippine Independence Act, Public Law 73-127, U.S. Statutes at Large 84 (1934): 456-465
89 Atienza, “Local Governments and Devolution in the Philippines,” 422
90 The 1935 Constitution, Article VII, Section 11
91 Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside,” 191
92 Coronel, et al., The Rulemakers, 74
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prospects and eventually, monopolizing power within their respective local bases.93 Large 
landowning families have taken advantage of this set-up and so in certain areas, a single 
family can effectively take hold of a legislative district for generations.94
The period of American colonization in the Philippines ushered many of the 
peculiarities that would later become a persistent feature in the politics of the country. The 
Americans encouraged local autonomy that took advantage of the existing patronage system 
from the Spanish era, allowing local elites to take part in the representative institutions while 
ensuring strong centralization of administrative authority, embodied by the American 
Governor-General, as a sort of check on the influence of the caciques in provinces and 
municipalities. The American colonial regime also made a distinct mark in not only colluding 
with these provincial elites, but even going as far as supporting the formation of Philippine 
political parties, though they were patterned after the patronage-style party system in the 
United States at that time.  
The Commonwealth period also set the precedent for a strong central Executive but 
did little to improve on central administration overall. Instead, the institutionalization of 
single-member districts and guaranteed representation of provinces in the legislative body in 
the fundamental law of the land set the precedent for bailiwick politics even after the full
independence of the Philippines in 1946.
4.3. THE FIRST DECENTRALIZATION LAWS POST-INDEPENDENCE (1946-1972)
Formal independence began with the inauguration of the Third Republic in 1946. At 
this time, the 1935 Constitution was still in place, but Congress passed important legislation 
that formally institutionalized decentralization by empowering local governments. Republic 
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
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Act No. 2264 or the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 reorganized provincial, city, and municipal 
governments and became the first of its kind in Philippine legislative history to set the 
precedent for a liberal interpretation of “local autonomy” in favor of local governments in the 
exercise of power and general welfare in their respective jurisdictions.95 Among its salient 
provisions include empowering the local board to pass its own budget, to impose its own 
municipal taxes or fees, to adopt its own zoning and planning ordinances, and to make their 
own procurements within their jurisdictions. The law also set clear provisions on the 
succession of local officials that no longer necessitated appointment by the President, except 
only in extreme cases. In addition, provincial governors and city and municipal mayors were 
empowered to make appointments for positions such as treasurer within their own respective 
jurisdictions. In practice, the provincial governor became more powerful, as he now had, to a 
certain extent, supervisory powers over municipal mayors and the provincial government can 
check on actions and ordinances passed by municipal councils. Thus, decentralization went 
beyond mere representation, and focused on building local autonomy through the 
devolution of administrative and political powers to local government.
At the national level, the Philippine Congress took a more proactive stance in creating 
new provinces. Within a decade after the passage of the Local Autonomy Act, 14 new 
provinces were created. At that point, the last time major changes in provincial borders made 
were during the early years of American colonial rule up to the 1920s. Congress also passed 
the Republic Act No. 5185 or the Decentralization Act of 1967 that granted additional powers 
to local government units, as well as greater autonomy to undertake actions without the need 
for national government approval such as settling disputes between municipalities within a 
95 Republic Act No. 2264, Section 12
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province, among others.96 Though it did not outline the criteria as to what can constitute a 
new province, the Decentralization Act did require the direct election of officers for newly 
created provinces and local government units, effectively taking away that power from the 
President.97 Nonetheless, the law retained the power of the President to suspend and remove 
local officials on legal grounds.98
The post-War period saw a much more assertive Congress as a national institution but
one made up of local officials with strong provincial bases. The President relied on provincial 
caciques that dominated the legislature for votes in order to pass important legislation while 
local officials needed to ensure a share of centrally administered funds to reach their 
districts.99 It is not surprising as well that the Presidents of the Third Republic, much like 
their Commonwealth predecessors, began their political careers as locally elected officials 
who relied on established bailiwicks by other provincial caciques to reach national office. 
This dynamic, however, would change with the imposition of authoritarian rule by President 
Ferdinand Marcos in 1972.
4.4. REGIONALIZATION AND CRONYISM UNDER THE MARCOS 
DICTATORSHIP (1972-1986)
In 1971, President Ferdinand Marcos, himself a second-generation politician who 
began his career in provincial politics, called for a Constitutional Convention to replace the 
Commonwealth-era constitution. This was largely viewed as a way for him to remove term 
limits by shifting to a parliamentary form of government. 100 A year later, with the 
96 Republic Act No. 5185, Sections 11 and 12
97 Republic Act No. 5185, Sections 8, 9, and 10
98 Republic Act No. 5185, Section 5
99 Coronel, et al., The Rulemakers, 75
100 Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines,44
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Constitutional Convention still in place, Marcos declared Martial Law throughout the 
Philippines, citing multiple security threats across the country. By that time, there was 
mounting pressure among delegates to speed up the process despite misgivings on transitory 
provisions that created an Interim Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) without a clear 
time limit and granted lawmaking powers to the President in violation of the principle of 
separation of powers. 101 Under Martial Law, the draft constitution, including these 
contentious provisions, was ratified in 1973 to mark the beginning of the Fourth Republic of 
the Philippines, through a plebiscite which Marcos himself ordered via presidential 
proclamation.
The imposition of Martial Law effectively put the country under one-man rule with a 
President who made the rules and a rubber stamp parliament that only served to give some 
semblance of separation of powers. What was interesting was that although dictatorial rule 
essentially centralized power to the Presidency, there was conscious effort to implement 
administrative decentralization across the country. 102 Among the very first policies 
implemented under the Martial Law regime was the “Integrated Reorganization Plan” (IRP). 
The IRP granted the President the power to create or dissolve government agencies. Under 
the guise of improving bureaucratic efficiency, the IRP also included a regionalization plan, 
wherein Central government offices, including ministries, would open regional offices 
supposedly to decongest services already concentrated in Manila. In this regard, Marcos 
clustered the provinces into twelve different regions and established Metropolitan Manila as 
the National Capital Region.103 Regional Development Councils (RDCs) were also created in 
101 Ibid., 49
102 Brillantes, “Decentralization, Devolution and Democratization,” 86
103 Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, 87
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order to coordinate policy planning among the provinces and with the central government 
socio-economic planning ministry.104
On paper, there was also support for promoting decentralization in governance and 
the promotion of local government autonomy. In contrast with the previous 1935 Constitution, 
the 1973 Constitution became the first for the country to have specific provisions on local 
government. It required the Batasang Pambansa to create a local government code that would 
set parameters for the creation of new provinces.105 It also required a majority approval of 
citizens, through a plebiscite, in creating or abolishing new provinces, cities, municipalities, 
or other subnational jurisdictions.106 Interestingly, the new Constitution also changed the 
composition of the Batasang Pambansa which had members elected at-large by region, 
though the provinces and previous local autonomy laws applicable were still retained.
In practice, however, the decentralization framework and policies set in place under 
Martial Law became merely instruments for legitimizing the authoritarian regime set in place 
by Marcos. Despite the explicit institutionalization of local autonomy in the constitution, the 
transitory provisions practically handed to Marcos the power to retain incumbent officials or 
appoint new ones107, thus rendering the provisions on local government practically inutile. 
Likewise, with the power to make laws granted to President Marcos, his Proclamation 1081 
which put the Philippines under Martial Law, and General Order No. 1, which put the entire 
government, including local governments, under presidential rule, rendered these institutions 
subordinate to Marcos himself.
The Marcos regime has been largely defined by the proliferation of cronyism and the 
suspension of civil liberties such as the freedom of expression and the right to assembly. 
104 Ibid.
105 The 1973 Constitution, Article XI
106 Ibid.
107 The 1973 Constitution, Article XVII
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Using the government bureaucracy, both civilian and military, as his power base, Marcos 
rewarded allies with government posts and control over government-owned corporations 
while punishing critics and members of the opposition.108 In line with the regionalization 
scheme under the IRP, Marcos appointed as “Presidential Regionals Officers for 
Development” members of the military, as well as key supporters coming from prominent 
families in each region such as the Enriles of Cagayan Valley, the Romualdezes of Leyte, the 
Duranos of Cebu, and the Dimaporos of Lanao.109 He even appointed his wife, the First Lady 
Imelda Marcos as governor of the Metro Manila region. These regional leaders in turn, 
recommended to the President whether to retain incumbent officials or to appoint new ones, 
thus practically turning local government posts as political favors vulnerable to the system of 
patronage. 110 Decentralization under Marcos was implemented based on the 
regionalization of the bureaucracy but with a strong central figure that gained 
legitimacy from local elites by retaining existing local government structures.
Reacting to external concerns about the legality of martial rule in the Philippines, 
Marcos ordered the conduct of elections for the Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) in 
1978 and for local elections in 1980, while the country was still technically under Martial 
Law.111 These elections, however, were merely for show in a sense that almost everything 
had the touch of Marcos himself. Marcos created a new coalition called Kilusan ng Bagong 
Lipunan (KBL or Movement of the New Society) supposedly composed of members from the 
old political parties. To gain access to the national machinery and electoral resources, it was 
in the interest of local candidates to join the KBL. It also served as a loyalty check for the 
108 Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, 76
109 Celoza notes that at different points, these regional leaders were called by different titles such as Presidential 
Regional Monitoring Officers, Presidential Action Officers, among others, but all serving under the pleasure of 
the President.
110 Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, 87
111 Ibid., 62-67
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dictator since, incidentally, the Minister of Local Government at the time was also the 
national party chairman of the KBL.112 Not surprisingly, 68 governors out of 73 provinces 
and 91% of the Batasang Pambansa were members of KBL.113
Decentralization under Martial Law was one in which the central government 
maximized scale economies by administering based on regional clusters but at the same time 
retaining political legitimacy by colluding with existing provincial elites thus maintaining the 
status quo in the provinces. Under Martial Law, Marcos did not wield the power to create 
new provinces often despite his sweeping lawmaking authority, doing so only twice, with the 
creation of the province of Tawi-Tawi and the division of Cotabato. In each occasion, Marcos 
circumvented the plebiscite requirement mandated by the 1973 Constitution and even granted 
to himself the power to appoint new local officials. 
The cunning of the Marcos dictatorship was that it allowed political competition 
among local elites, but only to win favor from the President. At least 25 modern political 
clans first emerged during the Martial Law years.114 On the other hand, branding oneself as 
an opposition against local incumbents meant opposing Marcos himself. One of the most 
popular opposition figures during the Martial Law years was Senator Benigno “Ninoy” 
Aquino, Jr. whose assassination in 1983 became a rallying point for opposition forces. 
Under mounting pressure from the international community, Marcos called for snap 
elections in 1986. This time, there was a clear opposition with the widow of Senator Aquino, 
Corazon Aquino, as its standard bearer. Massive cheating in the snap elections and a coup 
attempt by a reformist faction of the military culminated in the EDSA People Power uprising. 
Marcos fled the country and Aquino took her oath of office as President of the Philippines. In 
112 Hutchcroft, “Linking Capital and Countryside,” 193
113 Celoza, Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines, 63; Philippine Electoral Almanac, 122
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the wake of this popular uprising, Aquino appointed a commission that would draft a new 
constitution to mark a new chapter in the country’s history.
4.5. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND POLITICAL DYNASTIES IN THE 
POST-EDSA DEMOCRACY (1986-present)
The 1987 Constitution, ratified months after the EDSA People Power uprising, 
marked the inauguration of the Fifth Republic of the Philippines. This new constitution was 
in essence, a direct repudiation and attempt at undoing the authoritarian regime set-up by 
former President Marcos. There was a conscious effort among the framers of the new 
constitution to introduce safeguards that were a direct reaction to the experience under 
Martial Law. It also included significant constrains to the power of the President such as the 
introduction of a single six-year term and the need for legislative approval in declaring 
Martial Law. 
In word and in form, it did not completely erase, but rather built upon certain 
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, including the provision on local governments. For one, 
the new constitution mandated a “just and fair share” of national revenues that should be 
automatically released to local governments115, with the hope of lessening the possibility of 
central government to use revenue allotments as a tool for patronage. There was also an in-
depth discussion of supporting the entry of “new blood” in politics even at the local level, 
with the introduction term limits for local officials as well. The new constitution ruled that 
local officials could enjoy three consecutive three-year terms only, with possibility of future 
re-election, only after a gap of at least three years.116 One major source of contention among 
115 The 1987 Constitution, Article X
116 Ibid.
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the members of the Constitutional Convention, was how to deal with the phenomenon of 
“political dynasties.”
Under the Declaration of Principles and State Principles, “The State shall guarantee 
equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be 
defined by law.” 117 The wording of this particular section was intentional. During the debates, 
there was an outright consensus that public service should not be used to accumulate political 
power; term limits were introduced to ensure that an individual could not do so, as in the case 
during Martial Law.118 However, proponents for an outright prohibition of political dynasties 
felt that term limits were not enough, noting that incumbency afforded built-in advantages not 
just to an individual but also to members of his or her family. One of these anti-dynasty 
proponents at the Constitutional Convention, Jose Nolledo, described a scenario that has 
since be used in defining what a political dynasty is and the rationale for banning such:
“In the case of local government officials like governors, for example, we allow them 
to have two reelections. If he is reelected twice, he can no longer run for reelection in 
which case, he will ask his close relative — a son or a daughter or a brother or a sister 
— to run for public office under his patronage. And in this case, we circumvent the 
rule against further reelection because it may also happen that his younger son may 
run for governor and he is still strong enough to exercise moral as well as effective 
influence upon the son. And the son becomes a sub-altern, subjecting himself to the 
will of the father who has apparently retired.”119
However, in the ensuing debates, there was concern that a sweeping ban on political 
dynasties would be an additional restriction that would contradict equal access to public 
office. The debate on political dynasties ended up as a discussion of definition, and who 
would best define such, resulting in the compromise which was to declare a prohibition of 
political dynasties as a matter of principle but leaving it up to Congress to make the 
117 The 1987 Constitution, Article II
118 Records of the Constitutional Commission No. 39
119 Records of the Constitutional Commission No. 90
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definition.120 To be fair, the 48-member Constitutional Convention itself was composed of 
individuals from different sectors, including the Church and civil society, and not just 
traditional politicians. Yet, their failure to settle the question of political dynasties has created 
a loophole that was since been taken advantage of by political dynasties themselves.
More than half of the composition of the House of Representatives during the first 
four congressional terms under the Fifth Republic (8th to 12th Congress) belonged to political 
families (Table 3). Members of the House of Representatives are elected from legislative 
districts drawn by province. This period covers the crucial first decade since the end of the 
authoritarian regime, when the foundations for democratic reforms were supposed to have 
been built.
Table 3. Members of the House of Representatives belonging to Political Families121
Generation
8th
Congress
(1987-1992)
9th Congress
(1992-1995)
10th Congress
(1995-1998)
11th Congress
(1998-2001)
1st Generation 31 32 34 37
2nd Generation 66 59 59 59
3rd Generation 22 34 31 32
4th Generation 3 3 12 11
Total from Political Families 122 (52.3%) 128 (59.3%) 136 (60.7%) 139 (62.1%)
Total Members of the House 214 216 224 224
Source: Coronel, et al., The Rulemakers, 60
The figures show that in the post-EDSA People Power era, political dynasties 
continue to proliferate in the Philippine Congress, envisioned to be the highest lawmaking 
institution in the country as a coequal branch of government, in contrast to the Martial Law-
era rubber stamp parliament. In this regard, the 1987 Constitution, which was supposedly the 
institutionalization of the democratization movement in the Philippines following 
120 Ibid.
121 These are members who have relatives that hold elective positions, including in-laws. First generation 
members were elected simultaneously with their relatives. Second to fourth generation members include those 
whose relatives were elected simultaneously or prior to them. The figures do not include those without relatives.
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authoritarian rule, was not able address the dynastic nature of its representative institutions. 
Inasmuch as it was a repudiation of one-man rule and cronyism, it appeared that the regime 
“change” simply became an entry point for a new faction of elite families or a simple shift in 
political alliance by ruling families.122 Not surprisingly, efforts to pass legislation in Congress 
that would define and prohibit political dynasties had consistently failed ever since. 
Congress did, however, comply with another constitutional obligation: the enactment 
of the Local Government Code. Under Martial Law, the Batasang Pambansa had passed the 
Local Government Code of 1983 (Batas Pambansa 337) but it was never effectively 
implemented since former President Marcos had essentially usurped powers that could 
circumvent its provisions. In fact, the enactment of a new Local Government Code to 
promote “genuine” decentralization became one of the key policy pledges of the President 
Corazon Aquino to contrast the new government from the authoritarian regime.
Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) 
operationalized decentralization in the context of the Philippines to include not just local 
autonomy among local government units (LGUs), but also greater participation of the private 
sector in governance. On top of the existing power of LGUs to collect their own local taxes, 
the new law guaranteed that 40% of the total Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) or the total 
internal revenue collection by the national government would go to all LGUs. Furthermore, 
LGUs at every level were now guaranteed a share of the IRA based on the formula laid out 
by the law. In other words, 23% of the total for example, would be subdivided among the 81 
provinces of the Philippines (Table 4). To determine how much would go to every individual 
province, those with a bigger population or with a larger area are expected to receive more, 
but the law also stipulates an equalizing fund regardless of size (Table 5).
122 Bello, et al., The Anti-Development State
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Table 4. Share of LGUs in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
LGU Type Total Number IRA Share
Provinces 81 23%
Cities 145 23%
Municipalities 1,489 34%
Source: Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991); Philippine Statistical Authority
Table 5. Formula to Determine IRA Share of each LGU
Criteria IRA Share
Population 50%
Area 25%
Equal Sharing 25%
Source: Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
The LGC also recognized the role of other institutions and actors beyond the 
government bureaucracy in implementing decentralization reforms, such as non-government 
organizations and civil society (i.e., debureaucratization) and public corporations and 
development authorities (i.e., delegation). In this way, decentralization became one 
important feature of post-EDSA democratization.
The LGC of 1991 also set clear parameters as to what new provinces (and other LGUs 
in general) can look like based on income, area, and population, with consideration for 
smaller islands. Congress was granted the exclusive power to create new provinces through 
law but it can only be activated through a majority approval via plebiscite. Elections for new 
officials would be synchronized with the next local election or through a special election 
organized by the Commission on Elections. Interestingly, despite considering the province as 
the largest subnational unit, the 1987 Constitution and the laws passed under it (including the 
LGC) still retained the Marcos-era region scheme in its administrative function. National 
ministries still maintained offices at the region level. Provinces and cities still were lumped 
together under Regional Development Councils (RDCs) for socio-economic development 
planning. In other words, inasmuch as LGUs were granted greater autonomy politically and 
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administratively, the national government still recognized the need, as it did under the 
previous regionalization plan, to maximize economies of scale. Thus, a newly created 
province would simply be welcomed into existing RDCs.
The idea of decentralization as democratization supposedly went beyond mere 
representation, and idealized greater access among citizens in governance. However, 
although the socio-political atmosphere that emerged post-EDSA People Power formalized 
larger democratization in the legal framework but in practice, it has been hijacked by certain 
actors, most especially elite families under the so-called “EDSA system.” It is in this regard 
that there is a need to critically assess the dynamic process of decentralization by looking into 
particular, the role of elite families that have been a fixture in the Philippine polity.  
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5.  FINDING LOCAL ELITE CAPTURE IN DECENTRALIZATION REFORMS
5.1. ELITE FAMILIES IN EVOLVING CENTER-LOCAL RELATIONS
Historical institutionalism as an analytical lens allowed us to situate local elite 
families as actors throughout the dynamic process of decentralization. The previous section 
showed how the central-level administrations exercised varying degrees of centralized and 
decentralized governance over local governments. Whereas the concept of “decentralization” 
has been difficult to define precisely, the analysis of critical historical junctures showed 
different rationales for decentralization emerged at different points in time.
What is interesting was how central governments, whether the colonial authority or 
the post-independence republic under full Filipino control, had to deal with members of 
provincial-based elites across different parts of the country. The colonial administration of 
both Spain and the United States ensured that there was a strong central figure in the person 
of the Governor-General who had the final say in all matters of both national and local affairs. 
But the colonial regimes also needed to ensure their legitimacy over the natives and did so by 
colluding with certain sectors of the pre-existing society. The colonial government under 
Spain created a system of patronage wherein descendants of pre-colonial royal families took 
part in the exercise of colonial administration such as tax collection, and later on formed what 
became the principalia class. By the time the Americans took over, the principalias had 
gained significant political economic clout in their respective areas and were known as the 
caciques who owned vast tracts of lands and commerce. 
The American colonial administration needed to gain the support of these provincial 
elites who have previously financed the Philippine revolution against Spain and so introduced 
political representation of Filipinos in the colonial government. With the promise of “local 
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autonomy,” the Americans introduced elections for a new Philippine Legislature and local 
provincial and municipal councils across the country. Thus, the Americans “decentralized” 
governance by allowing representation through the newly established democratic institutions, 
in which members of provincial elites were invited to run for office and take part in 
policymaking but effectively giving the Governor-General the final say in the exercise of 
both national and local affairs.
Two key state institutions that would later play important roles in the implementation 
of decentralization reforms emerged: the Executive and the Legislative. Post-colonization, the 
modern Executive branch of the Philippines headed by the President emerged from the 
tradition of a strong central authority embodied by the colonial-era Governor General. 
Whereas the Governor General was the source of authority and resources during colonization, 
the President post-independence simply took over while retaining highly centralized powers. 
However, the Filipino President became one who was able to consolidate the various elites 
who formed provincial or even regional ethno-linguistic blocs. The first post-Independence 
presidents like Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña were provincial leaders who were able to 
create a national base which eventually brought them to the highest office in the country.
Unlike the Executive, the first Filipino legislature was first organized by inviting local 
elites from different provinces and consolidated them into one national body, Congress. In 
addition, political parties in the country were woven into the clientelistic system of patronage 
that began since colonization, thus making them rife for personality-based elections that 
make it easier for political dynasties to simply bank on their family name to win votes. 
Furthermore, the institutional arrangement wherein legislative districts were arranged 
according to provinces encouraged a kind of bailiwick politics in which a particular family 
can solidify their control over a particular area from generation to generation. Over time, 
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descendants of these local elites formed the political dynasties that continue to dominate 
Congress and local positions today.
Both the Executive and the Legislative branches in the Philippines have exerted 
significant influence in the introduction and implementation of institutional reforms such as 
decentralization, though as Eaton had previously noted, the two branches may have different 
motivations behind supporting such reforms.123 Tracing how state institutions were formed 
can help us “locate” possible local elite capture of decentralization reforms in the Philippines.
5.2. THE CREATION OF PROVINCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
As there was no “Philippines" as a nation prior to the establishment of a central 
authority under colonial rule, the creation of provinces is essentially a  part of the overall 
formation of institutions in the Philippines, thus linking it to evolving center-local relations 
and the institutional interactions that occurred among the various actors throughout this 
historical process. Throughout the history of the Philippines, the creation of provinces was 
carried out either by order of the chief executive of the central government or through 
legislation passed by Congress, though the role shifted between them throughout different 
time periods that reflect changing rationales and motivations in the implementation of 
decentralization reforms. Table 6 summarizes the origins of the provinces in the Philippines, 
categorized according to the historical junctures identified in the previous section. 
Previous studies have shown that as part of decentralization reforms, certain actors 
can push for the creation of subnational jurisdictions through the process of gerrymandering. 
One explanation for “gerrymandered decentralization” to occur is that it is a strategic choice 
of central actors to accommodate rent-seeking among local elites by pouring of patronage 
123 Eaton, Politicans and Economic Reform in New Democracies, 210
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resources over these newly created jurisdictions. Earlier, we have traced how the Executive 
and Legislative branches of government evolved into two distinct institutions over time, 
while noting how political dynasties emerged throughout the formation of these institutions. 
While the modern Executive (i.e. the President) evolved into a national figure from a 
local base who eventually became the “central figure of the center” that can share patronage 
resources or authority, Congress became a national-level body but one made up of elites with 
strong local bases that can support or block the initiatives of the President. As such, a simple 
dichotomy between “national elites versus local elites” may not necessarily paint a complete 
picture in studying decentralization in the Philippines. One can even argue that there really is 
no true “national” elite inasmuch as it is an amalgamation of various local elites scattered 
across the country. By focusing on the evolution of local elite families into political 
dynasties within the historical-institutional context of center-local relations in the 
Philippines, we are also able to analyze how local elite capture of decentralization 
reform can be possible by distinguishing between Executive-led gerrymandering versus 
Legislative-led gerrymandering.
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Table 6. Philippine Provinces by Historical Juncture
Spanish Colonial Era 
(including First Republic)
American Colonial Era 
(including 
Commonwealth)
Post-War Era
(Third Republic)
Marcos Dictatorship
(Fourth Republic)
Post-EDSA
(Fifth Republic)
Ilocos Norte
Ilocos Sur
La Union
Pangasinan
Cagayan
Batanes
Isabela
Nueva Vizcaya Nueva VizcayaQuirino
Abra
Lepanto
Mountain Province
Kalinga Kalinga-Apayao KalingaApayao Apayao
Padre Burgos Benguet BenguetIfugao Ifugao
Bulacan
Bataan
Nueva Ecija
Nueva Ecija
Tayabas QuezonAurora Aurora
Marinduque
Pampanga
Tarlac
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Zambales
Batangas
Cavite
Laguna
Rizal (formerly Morong)
Mindoro Oriental MindoroOccidental Mindoro
Paragua PalawanCalamianes
Albay Albay AlbayCatanduanes Catanduanes
Camarines Camarines NorteCamarines Sur
Masbate
Sorsogon
Capiz Capiz
Capiz
Aklan
Romblon
Antique
Iloilo IloiloGuimaras Guimaras
Negros Occidental
Bohol
Cebu
Negros Oriental Negros OrientalSiquijor Siquijor
Leyte LeyteBiliran Biliran
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Southern Leyte
Samar
Samar (Western Samar)
Eastern Samar
Northern Samar
Zamboanga Zamboanga del Sur
Zamboanga del Sur Zamboanga del SurZamboanga Sibugay
Basilan
Zamboanga del Norte
Misamis
Bukdinon
Misamis Occidental
Misamis Oriental Misamis OrientalCamiguin
Lanao Lanao del SurLanao del Norte
Davao
Davao del Sur Davao del SurDavao Occidental
Davao del Norte Davao del NorteCompostela Valley
Davao Oriental
Cotabato
Cotabato (North)
Cotabato (North Cotabato)
Sultan Kudarat
Maguindanao
South Cotabato South CotabatoSarangani
Agusan Agusan del NorteAgusan del Sur
Surigao Surigao del NorteSurigao del Norte
Surigao del Norte
Dinagat Islands
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Surigao del Sur
Sulu SuluTawi-Tawi
Sources: Kalaw (1927), PCDSPO (2016), The Administrative Code of 1917, The 1987 Constitution 
Notes: The creation, subdivision, consolidation, or renaming of provinces can be traced chronologically from left to right. Provinces are listed from north to south as they 
appear in the Philippine map, to reflect present-day regional clustering and geographical proximity, as far as practicable. The “creation” of a province is based on the 
establishment of a formal subnational government entity under the supervision or authority of the central government. Places listed in italics indicate sub-provinces created 
under the provinces immediately above it. 
52
5.3. EXECUTIVE-LED GERRYMANDERING
During the period of colonization, both under Spain and the United States, the 
creation of provinces was done by the authority of the Governor General as chief executive of 
the islands. Local officials were relegated to the mere execution of decisions made at the 
center and their authority to do so was incumbent upon the colonial administration, even with 
the introduction of elections and representative institutions by the Americans, wherein 
Filipinos, or at least a certain section thereof, were able to take part in policymaking. By 
prioritizing the creation of representative institutions to share in political power, at the 
expense of professionalizing the bureaucracy in exercising administrative control, the 
Americans were able to quell separatist sentiments among the section of the population that 
had the economic clout to fund revolutions in the first place. So much so that by the time the 
Americans left, Filipino elites who made their way to national prominence under American 
rule simply took over the void left by the former colonizers. 
The Commonwealth government and the early years of the post-independence 
Republic of the Philippines saw a strong central authority under a Filipino President, who 
exercised supervisory powers over the entire bureaucracy, including that of local affairs. 
While Filipinos now took reins of government, supporters of a strong central government 
prioritized national consolidation over those who wanted stronger local governments. The 
new President essentially replaced the old Governor General as the primary source of 
administrative authority and control of patronage resources. Interestingly, this period did not 
see the creation of any new provinces in the country.
Similarly, when President Marcos declared Martial Law, he essentially centralized 
decision-making authority to himself and cunningly created a system of patronage masked as 
his regionalization scheme. In halting the conduct of local elections, he was able to retain 
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incumbent officials in their positions indefinitely, and then, by granting himself the power to 
dismiss the same local officials and replace them with new ones, he became the main source 
of all power and authority under the authoritarian regime. Loyalty to the dictator became 
crucial for local elites to get their share of patronage resources. His regionalization scheme 
not only relegated the legislative branch as a rubber-stamp parliament, it also changed the 
makeup of membership to Congress at the regional, instead of the provincial level. Despite 
having the power to do so, Marcos only authorized the creation of four new provinces, but he 
also ensured that the resources to actually run these local governments would come from the 
Office of the President himself. The rubber-stamp parliament did not assert their power to 
create provinces either. Perhaps they themselves did not see the need to do so, since by that 
time, seats were appropriated on a per region basis and electoral advantage was determined 
by allegiance to Marcos.
The power relations between the central executive and local provincial officials under 
Executive-led gerrymandering fits well with the dynamics described under the “strategic 
choice” theory of gerrymandering. In the Philippine setting, it appears that the strong “central” 
authority described by previous literature pertains to a powerful President, with largely 
unchecked control by a legislative branch, and who exercises great authority over local 
governments. 
5.4. LEGISLATIVE-LED GERRYMANDERING
Within a decade after the passage of the Local Autonomy Act in 1959, the division of 
large provinces into smaller jurisdictions was carried out through legislation. A number of 
sub-provinces were “upgraded” as full-fledged provinces that can now enjoy representation 
in Congress while at the same time, practice full autonomy without the supervision of a 
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“mother province.” The provinces of Southern Leyte and the division of Samar were formed 
following the borders of existing legislative districts, something that has never been done 
before. Meanwhile, the large provinces in Mindanao, Lanao, Cotabato, and Davao, that used 
to have only one representative in Congress before, were divided into two new provinces that 
were each represented as “lone legislative districts” in Congress (Table 7). 
Although legislators could pass laws to create new provinces, the power to render the 
law in effect, was still legally vested at the discretion of the President, through an official 
proclamation. Also, the transitory provisions of these laws granted the President the power to 
appoint the first set of officials of a new province until the regularly schedule local elections 
were to take place. This created an interesting dynamic between Congress and the President.
By becoming the initiators in the subdivision of provinces or the creation of new ones, 
the Legislative branch was now able to assert the power to define its membership on its own
since every province was entitled to automatic representation in Congress. By defining the 
borders of the new province through law, Congress in essence, was also able to define the 
jurisdiction of a new legislative district. On the other hand, it did not completely usurp power 
from the President since he still retained the power to “activate” the law while at the same 
time, having the opportunity to appoint allies to key local posts before elections were held in 
accordance with the transitory provisions of the law. Obviously, this provided appointed 
officials the advantage of incumbency by the time citizens got to vote while giving the central 
appointing authority a chance to consolidate a new local base. After all, the pathway to the 
Presidency, almost always began at the local level. To win elections, the President had to 
appease local elites who had a strong base in their respective areas. Thus, the President did 
not necessarily veto legislation of this kind.
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An interesting note on these new provinces at the time was that the incumbent 
representatives prior to division almost always became the congressman to represent the new 
province created. Additionally, the creation of new provinces also brought “fresh” members 
of Congress who had never served in the national legislature before. Out of the 25 political 
families that emerged in Congress during this period, nine began to solidify their footing in 
the newly subdivided provinces.124 While majority of the legislators were able to hold on to 
their seats up until President Marcos abolished Congress under Martial Law, some never 
made a comeback. The nine political families that emerged during the creation of these new 
provinces either persisted as part of Marcos’ coalition (i.e., the Cosalan sof Benguet, the 
Sarmientos and Cagas of Davao and the Plazas of Agusan del Sur) or made a comeback after 
the reorganization of local governments following the People Power uprising (i.e., the 
Badelles of Lanao del Norte, the Lumauigs of Ifugao, and the Chiongbians of South 
Cotabato). 
Similarly, the period after the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991 saw an 
accelerated pace in the creation of new provinces through legislative action. The LGC of 
1991 formalized the power to create new provinces exclusively to Congress, leaving the 
President only with the power of the veto as with any other legislation. It also opened a new 
dimension in the creation of subnational jurisdictions. In addition to guaranteed local 
autonomy and representation in Congress, new provinces were assured of a share in national 
revenue collections, determined by a formula set by law.
However, the LGC of 1991 also featured a number of institutional constraints that had 
not been present before, such as term limits for local officials, as well as minimum 
requirements in size, area, and income as to what could constitute a province. One interesting 
124 Coronel, et al., The Rulemakers, 72-73
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note is that, according the LGC, a province should have at least 250,000 inhabitants, which is 
the same requirement the Constitution set in creating legislative districts in Congress. Thus, it 
is not surprising that many of the provinces created after 1991 followed the territorial 
boundaries of existing legislative districts. (See Table 8.) In other words, one province 
represented as two legislative districts in Congress, for example, became two distinct 
provinces with two separate “lone” legislative districts. The LGC also did away with sub-
provinces altogether and constituted them as provinces in their own right. 
In this regard, an interesting pattern emerged. Similar to the case in the 1950s and 
1960s, some incumbent representatives at the time of province creation secured their spot as 
the representative of the new province, as in the case Chiongbian in Sarangani or Ecleo in 
Dinagat Islands. However, unlike before, a number of congressmen who helped shepherd the 
legislation to create a new province eventually either became governor of the province they 
helped create in the first place or had a family member become governor. Facing term limits, 
some congressmen simply ran for governor and had a family member run for their seat in 
Congress. This was the case of Chiongbian in Sarangani, Bulut in Apayao, Ecleo in Dinagat 
Islands, and Bautista in Davao Occidental. The reverse can also be true wherein local 
officials such as governors or former Mayors were now able to enter Congress by running to 
represent the new province as in the case of Nava in Guimaras and Amatong in Compostela 
Valley.
In most cases, the new province became a “safe seat” for certain political clans, 
weeding out competition and securing both the governorship and a congressional seat (see 
Table 8). In the Dinagat Islands for example, although Glenda Ecleo had served as the 
representative of the 1st District for decades, their family was not able to clinch the 
governorship of Surigao del Sur due to competition with the Barbers clan that controlled the 
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2nd District, which included the provincial capital. Similarly, the Bautista clan had fought 
bitterly over the governorship of Davao del Sur with the Cagas family, although both clans 
had secured their seats representing the two districts of the province for decades. In the case 
of the Bautista family, which only emerged as a formidable provincial clan after the EDSA 
People Power, they were no match to the Cagas family that held the provincial capitol when 
the province was first created during the first division of Davao. Ironically, the members of 
the two rival clans were able to put political differences aside and actually became co-authors 
in the bill that created the province in the first place.
That said, the gamble to create new province did not necessarily work out in the long 
term for some clan members. The Hofer clan of Zamboanga Sibugay, for example, has 
struggled to retain the governorship of the province which clan patriarch George Hofer 
sponsored as the former Representative of the 3rd District of Zamboanga del Sur. Many of his 
relatives had failed to win province-wide seats and their influence has been limited to only 
one district. Likewise, the Sarmiento clan of Compostela Valley whose members had 
controlled the former 1st District of Davao del Norte and sponsored the creation of the new 
province had failed to make their mark in the province they helped create. Instead, the 
governorship fell into another newer clan that defeated them.
What is clear, however, is that political dynasties were able to maneuver through 
constraints set in place by the LGC of 1991 that was supposedly crafted in the era of 
decentralization as democratization. To an extent, the creation of new provinces did allow the 
entry of new political players in these new jurisdictions, but as often the case, they were most 
likely to be new dynastic clans themselves. The Espinas of Biliran and Navas of Guimaras 
were local dynasties that gained membership to Congress by running in their respective 
bailiwicks. On the other hand, some congressmen who had influence over a small portion of a 
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large province were able to establish their dynasty over an entirely new province on their own. 
The division of the former Kalinga-Apayao province, whose capital was located in the sub-
province of Kalinga, was too far from the hometown of the Bulut clan, whose influence 
largely centered in the Apayao area. In establishing two separate provinces, they were able to 
become among the few clans who held long uninterrupted rule over both the governorship 
and congressional seat, by rotating these positions among three family members only. 
In creating new provinces through legislation, lawmakers in Congress were able to 
secure the power, not only to define its own membership, but also to create entirely new 
jurisdictions with all the benefits entitled by law. Because of the dynastic makeup of 
Congress, however, the supposedly national lawmaking body acts to assert parochial claims 
rather than a “national” interest. In other words, despite being a national-level institution that 
constitutes a “national” elite, Congress becomes more of a vehicle in which local elites can 
forward their own respective interests. With the lack of a cohesive party system at the 
national level, these parochial interests are essentially tied with the personal interest of 
individual lawmakers themselves. 
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Table 7. Provinces Created from 1959 to 1969 (under Local Autonomy Act)
Province How Territory was Defined
Enabling Law and 
Date
First Congressman After 
Creation
Family 
Dynasty?
(Yes or No)
Years Individual or 
Family Held 
District/Province
Southern Leyte
Towns comprising 
former 3rd Legislative 
District of Leyte
Republic Act No. 2227 
(May 22, 1959)
Nicanor Yniguez, former 
Representative of the 3rd District 
of Leyte
No 29 years (1957 to 1986)
Lanao del Norte Defined by law dividing the province of Lanao
Republic Act No. 2228 
(May 22, 1959)
Laurentino Badelles, former 
Representative of the District of 
Lanao (undivided)
Yes 28 years (1957 to 1965; 1987 to 2007)
Surigao del Sur Defined by law dividing the province of Surigao
Republic Act No. 2786 
(June 19, 1960) Vicente Pimentel Yes
23 years (1961 to 1965; 
1987 to 1998; 2010 to 
present)
Eastern Samar
Towns comprising 
former 3rd Legislative 
District of Samar
Republic Act No. 4221 
(June 19, 1965)
Felipe Abrigo, former 
Representative of the 3rd District 
of Samar
No 15 years (1957 to 1972)
Northern Samar
Towns comprising 
former 1st Legislative 
District of Samar
Republic Act No. 4221 
(June 19, 1965)
Eladio Balite, former 
Representative of the 1st District 
of Samar
Yes 14 years (1957 to 1971)
Benguet
Towns comprising the 
former sub-province of 
Benguet under former 
2nd District of Mountain 
Province
Republic Act No. 4695 
(June 18, 1966)
Andres Cosalan, former 
Representative of 2nd District of 
Mountain Province
Yes
26 years (1965 to 1972; 
1978 to 1984; 1995 to 
2001; 2010-present)
Ifugao
Towns comprising the 
former sub-province of 
Ifugao under former 3rd
District of Mountain 
Province
Republic Act No. 4695 
(June 18, 1966) Romulo Lumauig Yes
8 years (1969 to 1972; 
1987 to 1992)
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Kalinga-Apayao
Towns comprising the 
former sub-province of 
Kalinga-Apayao under 
former 1st District of 
Mountain Province
Republic Act No. 4695 
(June 18, 1966) Felipe Almazan No 3 years (1969 to 1972)
Camiguin
Former sub-province, 
separated from province 
of Misamis Oriental
Republic Act No. 4669 
(June 18, 1966) Jose Neri No
5 years (1969 to 1972; 
1984 to 1986)
Quirino
Former sub-province, 
separated from province 
of Nueva Vizcaya
Republic Act No. 4734 
(June 18, 1966)
(represented in Congress through 
Nueva Vizcaya until 1984) - -
South Cotabato
Defined by law dividing 
the province of 
Cotabato
Republic Act No. 4849 
(July 16, 1966) James Chiongbian Yes
18 years (1965 to 1972; 
1987 to 1998)
Davao del Norte Defined by law dividing the province of Davao
Republic Act No. 4867 
(May 8, 1967)
Lorenzo Sarmiento, former 
Representative of the Lone 
District of Davao
Yes 21 years (1965 to 1972; 1984 to 1998)
Davao Oriental Defined by law dividing the province of Davao
Republic Act No. 4867 
(May 8, 1967) Constancio Maglana No 3 years (1969 to 1972)
Agusan del Sur Defined by law dividing the province of Agusan
Republic Act No. 4979 
(June 17, 1967) Democrito Plaza Yes
34 years (1969 to 1972; 
1984 to 1998; 2001 to 
present)
Notes: The provinces listed here were those that were created within the first decade after the passage of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959. The criteria to create these 
provinces, including their territorial boundaries, were determined by the enabling laws indicated here. For Kalinga-Apayao, South Cotabato, and Davao del Norte, the 
number of years was counted up until these provinces were further subdivided after the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 under the Fifth Republic. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the first Congressman elected after the creation of a province had not served in Congress prior to his election.
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Table 8. Provinces Created from 1992 to 2016 (under Local Government Code)
Province How Territory was Defined
Enabling Law and 
Date
First Congressman After 
Creation
Family 
Dynasty?
(Yes or No)
Years Individual or 
Family Held 
District/Province
Sarangani
Towns comprising 
former 3rd Legislative 
District of South 
Cotabato
Republic Act No. 7228
(March 16, 1992)
James Chiongbian, former 
Representative of the 3rd District 
of South Cotabato
Yes 23 years (1987 to 2010)
Biliran
Towns comprising the 
former sub-province of 
Biliran under former 1st
Legislative District of 
Leyte
Local Government 
Code
(May 11, 1992)
Gerardo Espina, former Mayor 
of Naval (capital) Yes
23 years (1995 to 
present)
Guimaras
Towns comprising the 
former sub-province of 
Guimaras under former 
2nd Legislative District 
of Iloilo
Local Government 
Code
(May 22, 1992)
Catalino Nava, former Governor 
of Sub-province of Guimaras Yes
24 years (1988 to 1992; 
1998 to present)
Apayao
Defined by law 
separating the province 
of Kalinga-Apayao
Republic Act No. 7878
(February 14, 1995)
Elias Bulut, former 
Representative of Lone District 
of Kalinga-Apayao
Yes 26 years years (1992 to present)
Compostela Valley
Towns comprising 
former 1st Legislative 
District and parts of 2nd
Legislative District of 
Davao del Norte
Republic Act No. 8470 
(January 31, 1998)
Rogelio Sarmiento, former 
Representative of 1st District of 
Davao del Norte
Yes 14 years (1987 to 2001)
Prospero Amatong, former 
Governor of Davao del Norte Yes 29 years (1987 to 2016)
Zamboanga Sibugay
Towns comprising the 
former 3rd District of 
Zamboanga del Sur
Republic Act No. 8973
(February 22, 2001)
Belma Cabilao, former 
Representative of 3rd District of 
Zamboanga del Sur
No 12 years (1992 to 1998; 2004 to 2010)
Dinagat Islands Towns comprising some Republic Act No. 9355 Glenda Ecleo, former Yes 26 years (1987 to 1995; 
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maritime portion of the 
former 1st District of 
Surigao del Sur
(December 2, 2006) Representative of 1st District of 
Surigao del Sur
2001 to present)
Davao Occidental
Towns comprising the 
former 2nd District of 
Davao del Sur
Republic Act No. 10360
(October 28, 2013
Franklin Bautista, former 
Representative of 2nd District of 
Davao del Sur
Yes 31 years (1987 to present)
Notes: The provinces listed here were those that were created the passage of the Local Government Code. The criteria to create these provinces were set by the LGC, while 
the territorial boundaries were determined by the enabling laws indicated here. The count for number of years starts from 1987 after the inauguration of the Fifth Republic.
Table 9. Political Dynasties in the New Provinces Created under 1991 LGC
Province Governor Vice Governor Representative
Sarangani Priscilla Chiongbian (1995 to 2004)Steve Chiongbian Solon (2013 to present)
Steve Chiongbian Solon (2007 to 2013)
Bridget Chiongbian-Huang (2004 to 2007)
James Chiongbian (1987 to 2001)
Erwin Chiongbian (2001 to 2010)
Biliran Rogelio Espina (2001 to 2010)Gerardo Espina Jr. (2010 to present)
Gerardo Espina (1995 to 2004)
Gerardo Espina Jr. (2004 to 2007)
Rogelio Espina (2010 to 2016)
Guimaras
Catalino Nava (1988 to 1995 as sub-
province)
Catalino Nava (1995 to 1998)
Joaquin Carlos Nava (2007 to 2016)
Lucille Nava (2016 to present)
Apayao Elias Bulut (2001 to 2010)Elias Bulut Jr. (2010 to present)
Elias Bulut (1992 to 2001)
Elias Bulut Jr. (2001 to 2010)
Eleanor Bulut-Begtang (2010 to 
present)
Compostela Valley Prospero Amatong (1987 to 1998 in Davao del Norte)
Prospero Amatong (1998 to 2007)
Rommel Amatong (2007 to 2016)
Zamboanga Sibugay George Hofer (2001 to 2010) George Hofer (1998 to 2001)
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Dulce Ann Hofer (2001 to 2004; 
2013 to present)
Dinagat Islands Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman (2007 to 2010)Glenda Ecleo (2010 to present)
Geraldine Ecleo-Villaroman (2010 to 2016)
Benglen Ecleo (2016 to present)
Glenda Ecleo (1987 to 1995; 2001 
to 2010)
Ruben Ecleo (2010 to 2013)
Davao Occidental
Benjamin Bautista Jr. (2001 to 2007)
Claude Bautista (2007 to 2010 in Davao del 
Sur; 2016 to present in Davao Occidental)
Franklin Bautista (2016 to present)
Benjamin Bautista Sr. (1987 to 
1998)
Franklin Bautista (1998 to 2001; 
2007 to 2016)
Claude Bautista (2001 to 2007)
Lorna Bautista-Bantigan (2016 to 
present)
Notes: The provinces listed here were those that were created the passage of the Local Government Code. The criteria to create these provinces were set by the LGC, while 
the territorial boundaries were determined by the enabling laws indicated here. The count for number of years starts from 1987 after the inauguration of the Fifth Republic.
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6.  CONCLUSION
6.1. LEGISLATIVE-LED GERYMANDERING AS EVIDENCE OF LOCAL ELITE 
CAPTURE
One key assumption of the strategic choice theory of gerrymandering considers the 
relationship between national actors and local elites as one between rent-giver and rent-taker. 
By situating local elites in the historical process of decentralization in the Philippines, we are 
able to distinguish differences in the formation of two national institutions that had authority 
to create provinces in the country: the Executive branch and the Legislative branch. Whereas 
Filipino involvement in state administration began with the co-option of local elites by 
colonial authorities into national institutions, two distinct paths emerged. The Executive 
branch, represented by the President evolved to replace colonizers as the central source of 
patronage but one who had to consolidate his/her own provincial base and securing support 
of others, while the Legislative branch evolved to become a congregation of provincial elites 
in supposedly representing local interests. 
With the absence of platform or ideology-based political parties, itself a colonial 
legacy that relegated party formation as a means to exercise patronage politics, Congress 
evolved to perpetuate personality-based interests rather than platform-based debates. This 
created an environment for the perpetuation of political dynasties since electoral succession 
was not based on party interests but rather family interests. By the time decentralization was 
introduced in its current form under the Fifth Republic and the Local Government Code of 
1991, the body tasked to set the “rules of the game” were themselves members of local elites 
who happen to constitute a national body. Even with the introduction of additional 
institutional constraints such as term limits, members of these political dynasties were able to 
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persist by using available loopholes in the laws they created (such as a Congressman running 
for provincial governor and vice versa) or by collectively ignoring Constitutional 
requirements (such as providing a legal regulation over political dynasties). In this regard, an 
interesting interplay between the Executive and Legislative branch emerged. Despite the 
President being barred from serving another term, alliance with a popular President can be 
beneficial for the re-election prospects of a congressman (or any other local politician for that 
matter) while the opposite may hold true. Moreover, for a President to accomplish a policy 
agenda, he or she needed support not only from his or her own local based but also that of 
other potential provincial or regional blocs in Congress.
Under this situation, a simple dichotomy between center actors versus local elites is 
not enough to analyze the phenomenon of elite capture of institutions. Rather, the very nature 
of the institutions themselves shows that in the Philippines, what is considered “central” is in 
fact merely an amalgamation of “local.” The creation of new provinces initiated by a strong 
central executive (i.e. colonial Governor-General or post-independence President) appears to
fit in the current understanding of the strategic choice theory of decentralization reform. The 
strong central executive taking control over patronage resources can likewise appease local 
rent-seekers.
However, when compared with province creation initiated by Congress, which itself 
evolved to cater to its dynastic members, legislators were able to create safe seats for 
themselves or for their kin. This way, they were able to maneuver through institutional 
constraints such as term limits and even the constitutional ban on political dynasties. 
Moreover, by creating new provinces carved out of old legislative districts, they are able to 
gain access to intergovernmental transfers reserved for provinces.
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In this context, local elite capture can be viewed not as the rent-seeking response
of local elites to the creation of provinces as a strategic choice by national authorities. 
Instead, the creation of provinces itself can be considered as the local elite capture of 
national institutions that has the power to create the rules for decentralization in the 
first place. Thus, this thesis presents some evidence of the creation of new provinces as 
an indicator of local elite capture.
6.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
Even though institutional constraints supposedly to promote greater opportunities for 
more citizens to engage in public service have been introduced following the democratization 
movement, including the express ban of political dynasties in the 1987 Constitution, only a 
few families continue to hold power in both the national and local level.  Dynasties continue 
to persist, and as some authors have noted, thrive under decentralization reforms. The actions 
of these families are not surprising from the historical-institutional standpoint. 
This also raises an important point in analyzing recent developments in the 
Philippines such as the election of former Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte as President 
and the ongoing push to amend the Constitution and create a federal form of government in 
the country. Prior to Duterte, no local government politician, let alone the mayor of a faraway 
southern city in Mindanao, has directly ascended to the Presidency. While he has been 
considered by some as a “disruptor” in Philippine politics, it is still important to point out that 
Duterte himself, like almost every other Philippine President belongs to a political dynasty. 
His father was a former governor, his daughter replaced him as Mayor and his son was 
elected Vice Mayor of their hometown. That said, should his push to revise the country’s 
Constitution succeed, without addressing the problem of political dynasties, not much can be 
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expected from these so-called “reforms” though it will definitely usher in a new critical 
historical juncture in center-local relations in the Philippines.
On the other hand, this thesis also highlights the need for new actors to counter the 
influence of political dynasties in Philippine institutions. To this end, it is also important to 
bear in mind how institutions themselves have evolved, no matter how painfully slowly, over 
time. After decades under authoritarian rule, new features of decentralization reform as part 
of democratization introduced new actors such as civil society groups and the private sector 
into the overall governance process. Though their influence may be small in the face of elite-
dominated dynastic politics, they are a significant starting point in creating better 
opportunities for ordinary citizens to take part in governance.
Finally, this thesis also provides a different perspective of local elite capture of 
decentralization reforms, which has great implication for developing countries, especially 
those with a history of colonization. In studying how national institutions were formed we 
were able to demonstrate how central government bodies such as Congress, can become an 
avenue for local elites, especially in the absence of clear platform-based political parties, to 
engage in rulemaking, rather than simply rule-taking.
6.3. RECOMMENDATIONS
The study highlights how research on political dynasties is important, given their 
persistence in Philippine institutions. Historical institutionalism was a useful analytical 
framework to situate political dynasties, as local elite families who are actors in the 
decentralization process, parallel to the formation of institutions in the Philippines. The focus 
on local elite families can be used as an important lens in studying how decentralization 
emerged in other countries as well. 
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This thesis also sheds light in the nature of gerrymandering that may occur under 
decentralization reform. For one, the differences between Executive-led gerrymandering and 
Legislative-gerrymandering can be a potential angle for research in the future. Previous 
studies have pointed out that these two branches of government may have different priorities 
to begin with. This study provides some historical basis as to why this is so. 
Due in part to limitations in data available, this thesis focused on the creation of 
provinces as the largest and most important subnational administrative unit in the country. 
With improvements made in the creation of databases down to the municipal and village 
levels, perhaps future studies can explore the persistence of political dynasties or the 
phenomenon of gerrymandering at these grassroots levels. One avenue for research is the 
investigation of smaller political dynasties whose influence may not necessarily go beyond 
the confines of their villages, towns, or cities, but can still benefit from the resources afforded 
to these local government units under decentralization reform.
Finally, from a policy perspective, this study emphasizes the importance of 
understanding the contexts as to which certain reforms are made. Indeed, decentralization, as 
with other government reforms, do not exist in a vacuum. Whereas, development can be 
pursued from different aspects, individual policy interventions are inevitably part of much 
larger complex processes that can be understood from differing, sometimes even opposing, 
paradigms. This is especially true in establishing relationships among important actors under 
institutional reforms such as decentralization.
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